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Context and Cultural Understanding
Richard Shusterman
I
Jacob Lund, as editor of this journal, asked me to reply to Stefan Snaevarr’s 
paper entitled “Shusterman on Europe, Entertainment, and Equality.” Hon-
ored by this invitation and appreciating the considerable critical attention 
my pragmatist aesthetics has received from Professor Snaevarr, I feel duty 
bound to respond to his objections in the most direct and forthright way. 
The problem, however, is that I truly cannot recognize myself in the posi-
tions that Snaevarr attributes to me. This is an embarrassing confession 
because I have always tried to articulate my views as clearly and precisely 
as I could and because Stefan Snaevarr has long been an enthusiastically 
studious reader of my work and a friendly interlocutor.1 So if he has so 
seriously misrepresented my views on popular aesthetics, entertainment, 
and cultural identities, then perhaps he has genuinely misunderstood them 
because I have failed to make myself sufficiently clear. Thus, the main pur-
pose of my response must be to correct those misrepresentations by re-
minding readers, including Professor Snaevarr, of what I actually wrote and 
meant. Once the most serious of these misunderstandings are noted, I will 
suggest that some general lessons about cultural understanding could be 
derived from them.
Snaevarr’s article has two major dimensions: a critical analysis of my 
views on popular culture and (as evidentiary justification of his critique) 
an empirical survey of the traditions of popular art in Europe and their 
relationship to questions of social equality and political freedom. So even 
if Snaevarr is mistaken about my views and my seemingly arrogant “US-
centrism” (S 138), his article is very helpful in reminding us of the rich 
traditions of popular entertainment in Europe. My remarks, however, will 
focus on his critical interpretation of my positions. 
II
Snaevarr identifies four “hypotheses” that he finds in my pragmatist study 
of popular art and at which he directs his critique. 
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(a)  The more egalitarian a country is, the stronger the position of the 
popular culture within that country;
(b)  American popular culture enjoys worldwide popularity because of 
its egalitarian style, and/or because everything American is associ-
ated with egalitarianism; 
(c)  Europe has no popular culture to speak of.
(d) Europe is an entity of the same kind as the US. The USA is more 
egalitarian than Europe. (S 130)
I do not believe I ever asserted any of these views, and I am in fact criti-
cal of all of them (especially in the way they are formulated by Snaevarr). 
Indeed, I have explicitly argued against most of them. Before turning to 
these four theses that Snaevarr attributes to me, I, regretfully, must note 
a substantial misunderstanding about my aesthetics still earlier in his ar-
ticle. Snaevarr says I defend “popular culture” as being for “ordinary folks” 
in the American spirit “of the common Man”(S 129). My efforts in prag-
matist aesthetics were not aimed at defending popular culture in general, 
but rather popular art or popular aesthetics – i.e. cultural expression that 
consciously expresses aesthetic values, makes aesthetic claims, and often 
sees itself in artistic terms. Popular culture is a much wider category, in-
cluding things (like McDonald’s fast food) which seem neither motivated 
by aesthetic aims nor successful in realizing them. 
More importantly, I did not define or defend popular art in terms of its 
representing and satisfying “ordinary folks” or “the common Man” (S 129). 
My pragmatist anti-essentialism vehemently resists the very idea of such 
“a common Man” which strikes me as a dangerous act of homogenization 
and reification of very different kinds of people; a reductive abstraction 
that, moreover, is sexist in suggesting that the male gender is the norma-
tive measure. Instead, I repeatedly insist that what defines popular art 
as popular is neither the allegiance with the mythical common man (or 
average viewer) nor the interest of the mass audience of so-called “ordi-
nary folks.” Rather, all that is needed for popularity is an audience large 
or multitudinous enough to secure both economic viability and a hearing 
in the public sphere.2 
That is what rap had managed to achieve when I began thinking and 
writing about it as popular art in the late 1980s, when it was so remote from 
mainstream acceptability that colleagues described my fascination for it 
as criminal. Rap, heavy metal, and techno music are still not mainstream 
music for the common taste of ordinary folks (at least not in America); 
popular art, as these genres demonstrate, can even gain their popularity by 
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productively diverging from and challenging the mainstream views that 
ordinary folks share in a society. Popular art is important to democracy 
because it allows the expression of eccentric, even freakish tastes, not just 
ordinary or common taste. 
 
III
The major thrust of Snaevarr’s critique of my alleged views is that they 
reflect a misinformed American chauvinism and a negatively misguided 
perception of Europe. Reading his critique one could take me for an arro-
gant parochial American who knows and cares little about Europe, except 
as a playground for vacations and conferences and as a useful target for 
critique. So, perhaps I should set the record straight about my American 
identity, which is distinctly not all-American. I am a bi-national whose en-
tire university education was received outside of the United States (mostly 
in Israel) and was in fact completed in Europe, assuming, of course, that 
we consider Oxford (or more generally England) a part of Europe. (When 
I was at Oxford in the days of Thatcher, anti-European sentiments ran 
rather high.)3 
In some respects, my aesthetic theorizing about popular art is indeed 
American-centric. Though deploying a variety of philosophical sources from 
diverse traditions, my aesthetics is most deeply grounded in the tradition 
of American pragmatist philosophy, especially John Dewey’s.4 Moreover, in 
discussing popular art, I devote my more detailed critical analyses to musi-
cal genres most closely associated with contemporary American culture: 
rap and country music. My prime reason for focusing on these genres was 
their dramatically increasing popularity in the American culture in which I 
live, and the interesting ways they illustrate aspects of pragmatist aesthetics 
and challenge certain dominant ideas in the philosophy of art.
I never asserted that America was the only country with a developed 
popular art or that it had the best popular art. Instead, recognizing the 
generally acknowledged (and often lamented) worldwide influence of 
American popular culture,5 I tried to suggest how a constellation of cer-
tain “sociohistorical factors could … explain why it is that in America the 
popular arts … have thrived and most successfully challenged high art’s 
stranglehold on aesthetic and cultural legitimacy,” thus, resisting what 
Bourdieu describes as the “aristocracy of culture” based on traditions of 
courtly aristocratic society (PL 58, 59). This does not imply that American 
popular art is aesthetically superior, but rather that it has been less power-
fully subjugated by high culture and upper-class domination. 
I never claimed that “the more egalitarian a country is, the stronger the 
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position of the popular culture within that country” (Snævarr 130). Nor did 
I argue that America’s egalitarianism is what made popular art successful 
there. Instead, I note a variety of factors that could explain that success, 
most of which Snaevarr summarizes in the beginning of his paper. In fact, 
I never maintained (and do not believe) that America is truly egalitarian 
or is appreciably more egalitarian than all the countries of Europe. I make 
the different claim that American ideology has traditionally been more 
egalitarian than the traditional ideologies of most European countries that 
lived through centuries of feudalism and aristocracy. Ideology, however, is 
not reality; and egalitarian ideology does not ensure egalitarian practices. 
Not only do my discussions of rap and country music critically point to op-
pressive inequalities and injustices in American society (racism and class 
prejudice), I even argue that rap music and other African-American musi-
cal genres like jazz and R&B were able to develop so well precisely because 
their creators and initial target audiences suffered from severe failings of 
egalitarianism in the United States. The sad fact that the African-American 
culture and audiences that essentially created these genres did not receive 
equal respect had the compensating benefit that they were thus freer to 
develop their inspirational artistic energies outside mainstream society’s 
cultural constraints. As I put it in Pragmatist Aesthetics, these cultures 
were “so brutally excluded from the dominant society that they could be 
largely free from the grip of its dominant aesthetic” (PA 197). This is a far 
cry from Snaevaar’s accusation of my “maintaining that the US is a para-
gon of egalitarian virtues” (S 141).
My advocacy of American pragmatist philosophy and defense of some 
American genres of popular art is thus coupled with strong critique of 
American society and its failings to live up to its professed egalitarian and 
democratic ideals, not only in aesthetics but with respect to social and 
political issues.6 My general approach to American culture is similar to 
that which I take toward popular art – a meliorism that recognizes there is 
need for considerable improvement because of significant shortcomings, 
but that such improvement is worthwhile and possible because of the 
positive potential and already existing values that can be found there. My 
affirmations of American culture are thus tempered with strong warnings 
against the dangers of United States cultural hegemony.
Noting “the dangers of any one-sided cultural hegemony,” I immediately 
add explicitly that “This includes American popular culture” (PL 59). This 
hegemony, I indeed suggest, is largely the product of America’s military 
and economic might and influence rather than any intrinsic superiority of 
American genius. I make this point in an article for The Chronicle of Higher 
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Education, entitled “The Perils of Philosophy as a Lingua Americana,” where 
I warn against the dangers of America’s increasing philosophical hegemony 
(while avowing that I also profit from it).7 This philosophical hegemony is 
expressed in their domination of the most influential publishing venues, in 
the increasing indifference of United States philosophers to contemporary 
philosophy in Europe, and in their increasing failure to master and read 
in the philosophically important languages of German and French, even 
when they are studying classic thinkers and contemporary stars who wrote 
in those languages. The attitude seems to be that relying on English transla-
tions is sufficient, and that what is not translated is not worth making the 
effort to read. This, I argue, often leads American philosophers to be less 
well-informed than philosophers who read in a variety of languages. 
Moreover, in the more specific field of aesthetics, I have criticized the 
official journal of the American Society for Aesthetics (in the fifty-year 
celebratory issue of that same journal) for having taken “a path of increas-
ing parochialism” by being increasingly limited in their taste for Anglo-
American aesthetics.8 Given the editorial policies of the last few decades of 
that journal (The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism), one could hardly 
imagine that from the 1940s and up until 1965 it devoted considerable 
space and entire special issues to current aesthetics in Europe and in Asia, 
even occasionally printing non-English texts. Finally, in my writings on the 
theme of internationalism in philosophy, I have affirmed the value of an 
international model of multilingual dialogue while noting the dangers of 
internationalism through a single, dominant master language that insists 
on its exclusive universality.9 Though inspired in many ways by American 
pragmatism, my positions are very remote from those of a parochial Yan-
kee Doodle Dandy chauvinist. 
The fact that my writings on popular music are focused mainly on fam-
iliar American genres does not mean that I do not recognize the value of 
non-American music. I just know more about American musical culture 
than other musical cultures, and I prefer to write about what I know best. 
But the German techno scene (which I frequently enjoyed in Berlin) has 
also earned a place in my writing and indeed forms the opening vision 
and guiding inspiration for my study of the urban aesthetics of absence. 
Likewise, my study of hip hop reaches beyond America to invoke French 
rappers, whom I insist on quoting in French, even in the texts I publish in 
English. Moreover, in my writing on rap and country I have argued that 
these genres are themselves far from being purely American products, for 
example, by underlining the influences of African and Caribbean sources 
for rap, and of African, European, and Hawaiian sources for country 
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music. Finally, as Snaevarr indeed admits (in a note, S 142), I recognize the 
important role that European popular art has played in the past, while ex-
plaining how some of its greatest popular successes evolved into high art 
classics: Greek tragedy, Elizabethan drama, novels of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth century, and cinema in the twentieth.10 I, moreover, underline 
how important European theorists have affirmed the value of entertain-
ment or popular art, deploying the relevant views of Montaigne, Nietzsche, 
Gramsci, and Bahktin.
IV
As I refuse the caricature of a narrow, parochial, all-American booster, I also 
plead not guilty to the charge of failing to recognize the cultural complex-
ity of Europe. In my work on internationalism in philosophy, I describe 
how Europe does not form a neat philosophical continent of its own but 
that its countries in fact belong to different philosophical power groups 
or empires, and that such affiliations can change over time. In exposing 
certain problems and misconceptions in contemporary views of multi-
culturalism, I criticize the use of Eurocentrism as the opposite of multi-
culturalism because this “belies the great cultural diversity in Europe itself, 
which is surely richer and deeper than the five ethno-racial cat egories that 
make up the familiar American multicultural pentagon” (PL 185). And I 
go on to argue that the issue of multiculturalism plays out differently in 
different European countries because of their cultural diversity, which, as I 
note, includes cultural diversity (and sometimes even linguistic diversity) 
within the same individual European country. Does that recognition of 
diversity preclude me from speaking of Europe in general? Are only Euro-
peans allowed to speak of Europe or of European culture? They certainly do 
speak of these things, and if they did not, what would be the discourse and 
ideology of the European Union? Not only politicians but also Euro pean 
intellectuals (as far back as de Tocqueville) have made general contrasts 
between Europe and America. Of course, though we most often speak of 
Europe in general, we should be careful about essentialistic tendencies of 
generalization that mislead us into seeing important features of some ma-
jor European countries as being automatically features essential to all of 
them. But these same essentialist dangers exist even in talking about prag-
matist philosophy, which includes a variety of different perspectives that 
are not infrequently polemically opposed to each other. Still, I can rightly 
describe my aesthetics as grounded in pragmatism, even though it relies 
only on a limited range of pragmatist authors.
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V
I trust I have provided enough evidence to convince readers that my de-
fense of popular art is not the expression of a narrow American chauvin-
ism that has no respect for the European contributions to popular culture 
and no appreciation of Europe’s cultural complexity. Let me now turn 
from the negativity of denials so that I can offer some positive points with 
respect to context and cultural understanding that emerge from Snae-
varr’s misunderstanding of my position, despite his clear philosophical 
intelligence and his basic sympathy to some of my aims with respect to 
aesthetics and popular art. 
His misunderstanding, I think, comes from paying insufficient at-
tention to the particular context of my argument and its sociohistorical 
explanations for America’s seemingly greater acceptance of popular art. 
That context was an extended polemic against Pierre Bourdieu’s rejection 
of the very idea of popular art as a contradiction in terms. Bourdieu (who, 
like pragmatism, was a formative influence on my general philosophi-
cal orientation and at whose Parisian Centre de Sociologie Européenne 
I wrote Pragmatist Aesthetics) based his argument against the aesthetic 
legitimacy of popular art on an analysis of French society, both histori-
cal and contemporary. I challenged his argument, in the most respect-
ful manner I could, by criticizing his position for the error he typically 
attributed to philosophers – universalizing from one’s own experience 
and reifying it as necessary truth instead of recognizing that artistic legi-
timacy depends on cultural conditions that can vary in different times 
and places. So, I argued for America’s being more receptive to popular art 
than Bourdieu thought France was. 
Here is how I put it in Pragmatist Aesthetics: “However compelling [his] 
argument may be for the French culture Bourdieu studies, it fails as a 
global argument against popular art. For, at least in America, such art does 
assert its aesthetic status and provide its own forms of aesthetic legitima-
tion” (PA 196). I then reinforced this point by noting that “Certainly we 
Americans take neither philosophy nor the cultural hegemony of intellec-
tuals as seriously as the French and other Europeans do.” And I explained 
these differences regarding popular art and intellectual culture in terms 
of America’s difference from France (and by extension from other Euro-
pean countries) in terms of the sociohistorical factors that Snaevarr tries 
to summarize in the beginning of his article (but that are more carefully 
formulated in Pragmatist Aesthetics and again in Performing Live). Toward 
the end of my polemic with Bourdieu, where I was explaining America’s 
desire to escape the cultural domination of Europe (and that later seems 
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reflected in the desire of Europeans to break with familiar forms of cul-
tural domination by embracing American popular culture), I speak not 
of France specifically but of Europe in contrast to America. But given the 
evident context of my argument, the primary focus of my remarks about 
Europe was clearly France.11 By neglecting this context, Snaevarr misun-
derstood me as having a monolithic, essentialist view of Europe. But this 
misunderstanding can be redeemed by reminding us of the important 
philosophical truth that context is crucial in understanding. 
This central idea is shared by pragmatism, the ordinary-language phil-
osophy of Austin and Wittgenstein, and Bourdieu’s theory of communi-
cation, which all insist that linguistic meaning is essentially contextual. 
I have repeatedly tried to extend this contextual perspective in treating 
the topics of internationalism in philosophy and of identity politics in 
multiculturalism by arguing that cultural identity is also essentially con-
textual. In Israel, for example, I was identified as an Anglo-Saxon because 
I was born in America with English as my mother tongue. As a student in 
Oxford, no one considered me Anglo-Saxon. In that context, I was obvi-
ously an Israeli or an American Jew. I have noticed how people who are 
identified as New Yorkers when in the States or as Brétons when in France 
come to be seen, respectively, as Americans or as French when travelling 
abroad; and their own sense of cultural identity tends to shift correspond-
ingly with those shifting contexts. As I write in Performing Live (where 
I make a much more detailed case for the contextual nature of cultural 
identity), “One is more conscious of being a white man when one sud-
denly finds oneself surrounded by a large group of Japanese women” (PL 
194). I suspect the multiculturalism of the Nordic countries (for example, 
Swedish Finns) can provide its own cases of shifting contextual cultural 
identities. 
I try my best not to be the typical US-centric ugly American academic 
but rather a Euro-friendly one (who even makes the effort to give lectures 
in French and German). So, let me conclude with the friendly gesture of 
agreeing whole-heartedly with Stefan Snaevarr’s assertion of the problem-
atic complexity of European identity.12 Even determining the extension of 
which nations belong with Europe seems to be a problematic and contex-
tual affair, changing according to different contexts, interests, and political 
pressures. That is the view of Europe I learned from my life in Israel which 
belongs to Europe in terms of Eurovision and basketball and soccer (it 
used to belong to Asian soccer but was thrown out for political reasons), 
but it is neither geographically part of Europe nor part of the Euro pean 
Union. Nor is its major language part of the Euro-Indian language group. 
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Perhaps in some contexts Scandinavia is still contrasted with Europe (i.e. 
continental Europe), though I suspect that by now, in most contexts, it is 
included as Europe. I should stop here and leave this question to the 
Nordic intellectuals (including my friend Stefan Snaevarr) who read this 
journal and who know the relevant contexts here far better than I. 
Notes
1. Besides the article in The Nordic Journal of Aesthetics to which I am respond-
ing (to whose pages I will refer parenthetically with the abbreviation S), Snaevarr 
has published other articles focusing on my work. See his “Pragmatism and Popu-
lar Culture: Shusterman, Popular Art, and the Challenge of Visuality,” Journal of 
Aesthetic Education 41:4 (2007): 1–11; “The Thinker and the Rapper: Shusterman 
on Popular Culture,” Pop Matters, an online journal, posted 5 June 2002, http://
www.popmatters.com/columns/snaevarr/020605.shtml; and an interview he con-
ducted with me entitled “Livskunst, levende kunst,” Samtiden 3 (2001): 109–115, 
on the occasion of the publication of Performing Live (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Uni-
versity Press, 2000); hereafter abbreviated as PL. Snaevarr’s familiarity with my 
work in pragmatist and analytic aesthetics goes back to his doctoral studies, and 
he indeed spent a semester doing doctoral research with me at Temple University, 
funded by a Norwegian research grant.
2. I introduce this important distinction between a multitudinous and mass 
audi ence in Pragmatist Aesthetics: Living Beauty, Rethinking Art (Oxford: Black-
well, 1992), 190–191; hereafter this work will be abbreviated as PA. Its second 
edition (with a new introduction and an additional chapter on somaesthetics) was 
published by Rowman & Littlefield in 2000.
3. For those interested in how my bi-national identity has shaped my philosophi-
cal work, see Richard Shusterman, Practicing Philosophy: Pragmatism and the 
Philosophical Life (London: Routledge, 1997), ch. 7, and “Regarding Myself and 
Seeing Double, Fragments of Autobiography,” in George Yancey, The Philosophical 
I: Reflections on Life in Philosophy (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), 1–25.
4. I describe some of these influences and my path to pragmatism and somaes-
thetics in Richard Shusterman, “Somaesthetics at the Limits,” Nordic Journal of Aes-
thetics 35 (2008), 7–23.
5. The German cultural theorist Winfried Fluck offers a different but overlapping 
explanation of what he calls “the stunning worldwide resonance of American popu-
lar culture.” See his “California Blue: Americanization as Self-Americanization,” in 
Americanization and Anti-Americanism: The German Encounter with American 




6. For my views on democracy beyond the question of popular art, see Practicing 
Philosophy, chapters 2–3.
7. The Chronicle of Higher Education, August 11, 2000. B 4. In this article I also 
claim that American cultural dominance “seems a product of America’s political, 
economic, technological, and military dominance.” 
8. Richard Shusterman, “Aesthetics between Nationalism and Internationalism,” 
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 51 (1993): 157–167; quotation from 157. I 
develop this critique by also showing how American aesthetics took advantage 
of the European chaos of World War II and its immediate aftermath to usurp the 
international power of European centers of aesthetics in Germany and France. See 
Richard Shusterman, “Comment l’amérique a volé l’identité philosphique euro-
péenne,” in L’identité Philosophique Européenne, eds. S. Douailler, J. Poulain and 
P. Vermeren (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1993), 253–266.
9. See the special issue of Metaphilosophy I edited, entitled “Internationalism in 
Philosophy” and especially its lead article, Richard Shusterman, “Internationalism in 
Philosophy: Models, Motives, and Problems,” Metaphilosophy 28 (1997): 289–301.
10. I stress this point for example, in PA 181. Moreover, I also emphasize how 
important European theorists have affirmed the value of entertainment or popu-
lar art, discussing the views of Montaigne, Nietzsche, Gramsci, and Bahktin. See 
Richard Shusterman, “Entertainment: A Question for Aesthetics,” British Journal 
of Aesthetics 43 (2003): 289–307. 
11. When I speak of the European high culture tradition as originally shaped by 
“an aristocratic court and national church,” I was also thinking primarily of France 
and the polemic with Bourdieu (though obviously other European countries also 
had both aristocracies and national churches). Of course, the French Revolution 
ended the long reign of the Catholic Church as the official state religion of France. 
But by then, the notion of high culture (with its aristocratic and spiritual aura) had 
already received its basic form or character.
12. I should also note my respect for the cultures of Asia and my recognition of 
their cultural differences and complexities. Such respect finds expression in such 
publications as “Pragmatism and East-Asian Thought,” Metaphilosophy 35 (2004): 
13–42; “Asian Ars Erotica and the Question of Aesthetics,” Journal of Aesthetics 
and Art Criticism 65 (2007): 55–68; and “Definition, Dramatization, and Rasa,” 
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 61 (2003), 295–298.
